TIME: Taunts From the
Border
Monday, October 28, 2002
By MICHAEL WARE / PAKTIA
It was an impressive show of force. Under the cloak
of darkness last week, Chinook and Black Hawk
choppers dropped an entire battalion of 520 U.S.
paratroopers into a remote valley in Afghanistan,
just across the border from the rugged mountains of
Pakistan, where al-Qaeda has re-established training
camps. With dogs barking, cows chewing and a watchful
camel resting, the heavily armed U.S. force trudged
through irrigated fields and muddy Pashtun
villages--cordoning off a 3.5-mile-long area and
searching each of 150 residential compounds that
dangle off the nosebleed hillsides by the Kakh and
Khardala rivers. "We aim to get the maximum number of
people on the ground at once," says Major Mike
Richardson, paratroops operations officer. "It gives
us shock value."
But on this particular occasion, the value was
limited. Two complexes suspected of being al-Qaeda
staging posts were discovered with caches of hundreds
of rocket-propelled grenade rounds, mines and
ammunition, but the enemy was nowhere to be found;
the most threatening local seemed to be an old woman
carrying a hatchet over her shoulder and complaining
about her uninvited guests.
For the battle-ready members of the Army's 82nd
Airborne Division, such small victories, as
frustrating as they may be, will have to suffice.
That's because the troops areconfined behind
Afghanistan's border with Pakistan, unable to reach
the concentrations of al-Qaeda survivors safely
ensconced in camps in the mountains surrounding the
town of Mirim Shah. From these retreats in Pakistan,
al-Qaeda commanders can send out specially trained
teams to lob rockets at U.S. bases and air fields.
The most U.S. forces can do is disrupt the endless
teams of terrorists popping into Afghanistan, closing
off their transport routes and seizing weapons and
equipment stashed for them by abettors inside the
country. "This is the type of warfare that many folks
don't have the patience to fight. Hell, I don't know
if I'm patient enough," says Lieut. Colonel Martin
Schweitzer, battalion commander.
In some ways, the U.S. may be using forces too big
for their own good. In snippets of conversations
intercepted by U.S. intelligence, al-Qaeda leaders
have instructed cell members simply to lie low when
Americans descend because "there's too many of them."
Says Colonel James Huggins: "They won't confront us
in our superior numbers," which makes them almost
impossible to see.
In theory, the government of Pakistan's President
Pervez Musharraf is committed to routing al-Qaeda
elements from redoubts within Pakistan. But Islamabad
holds little sway in the tribal regions of the
northwestern frontier, which are largely autonomous
and which just voted in district governments with
Islamist agendas.
The Pakistani Frontier Corps, which is responsible
for guarding the border, is a ragtag, disorganized
militia that isn't even part of the country's regular
army or security forces. Recruited locally and often
unpaid, Corps members are susceptible to al-Qaeda
bribes. U.S. intelligence material suggests that the
Corps has been infiltrated by al-Qaeda, with the
terrorists sometimes donning their uniforms and
venturing into Afghanistan. There is also growing
evidence that al-Qaeda members have been posing as
Afghan government troops to get around and attack
U.S. patrols.
Some U.S. commanders think it is only a matter of
time before the U.S. has to launch its own combat
missions inside Pakistan. Until that happens, some
think the military should consider using small squads
of around 10 men to "bait them out," as one soldier
suggested to another in a creek bed during the recent
operation, adding, "Heck, I'll be bait." That, of
course, might result in U.S. deaths, which could
prove a propaganda victory for al-Qaeda. "You want to
chase down every one of them, but do you want todo
that on their terms or yours?" asks paratroops
intelligence officer Captain Patrick Willis. Lately,
it's not clear which side is dictating the terms, or
even winning the battle.