TIME: Iraq's Turn for the
Worse Brings U.S. and Baathists Closer
Wednesday, March 15, 2006
TIME Baghdad Bureau Chief Michael Ware reflects
on the changes he sees in Iraq after a two month
furlough.
By
MICHAEL WARE / BAGHDAD
I've spent the last three years immersed in this
conflict, but after only two months away I'm amazed
at how quickly this war has mutated into something
even worse than it was before. We're now seeing a
sectarian element nothing like we've previously seen.
Even ordinary families, people who are in no way
combatants are suddenly talking about fellow Iraqis
in terms of "us" and "them."
On
Civil War Danger
A senior Baathist commander of the insurgency told me
that while they're maintaining their own focus on
fighting Coalition forces and trying to stay out of
the sectarian dynamic, they fear that Iraq is on
course toward civil war, which they view as being
fueled by Islamist extremists on both sides -- the
imported al-Qaeda fighters and their Iraqi acolytes
on the Sunni side, and the militias of Moqtada Sadr
and the Iran-backed Badr organization among the
Shi'ites. And curiously enough, the assessment of the
Baathists seems to be shared by U.S. military
intelligence. A senior U.S. officer told me that they
see Iraq as still one step away from civil war,
because the sectarian violence is not yet
self-sustaining, and you're not seeing wholesale
"ethnic cleansing" of neighborhoods by militias: It's
still hit-and-run stuff, and it still requires
prodding and provocation by the likes of Zarqawi and
the most sectarian elements on the Shiite street.
U.S. intelligence believes there are enough
incentives for the major parties to restrain their
followers so that a civil war can be avoided. The
nationalist and Baathist insurgents don't want or
need it; the Shi'ite religious parties have won so
much power at the ballot box that it's not in their
interests to jeopardize that; it's not in the Kurds'
interests to see Iraq go up in flames and possibly
give Turkey a pretext to come in and seize Kirkuk on
the grounds that they're protecting the city's
Turkmen. It's only really the Zarqawi element that
wants a civil war. And if the Shi'ite leadership were
to lose control of the highly emotive Shi'ite street,
the al-Qaeda element may just get the war it wants.
On
the Meeting of Minds Between the Baathists and the
U.S.
The U.S. is hoping the Iraqi security forces will do
the heavy lifting in terms of quelling the sectarian
violence, and in many instances they've done a very
good job. There is some concern about the sectarian
flavor of some substantial parts of the security
apparatus, such as the commando forces maintained by
the Interior Ministry, one of the most effective
units among the Iraqi security forces but also
closely tied with the Iran-trained Badr militia.
Although the ranks of the new army are predominantly
Shi'ite, there's still a strong mix, particularly in
the officer corps, where there are a lot of Sunnis.
And the U.S. has been actively reaching out to Sunni
officers from the former army, many of them
Baathists, looking to bring them back in from the
cold.
The ongoing dialogue between the U.S. and the Sunni
insurgency is based on a shared wariness about the
influence of Iran and its supporters in Iraq. U.S.
officials are now saying bluntly that it's time to
bring back the Baath Party, excluding only those that
are guilty of specific crimes. That reflects a
growing acceptance among U.S. officials that the
military and bureaucratic know-how in the Sunni
community is badly needed, even to help run the
security forces that the U.S. is standing up.
Senior Baathist insurgent commanders are responding
positively to the U.S. outreach on the political and
military level. One senior commander I spoke to
praised the U.S. for the release of some key Baathist
officers who had been imprisoned, and later, when I
asked a senior U.S. intelligence officer about the
releases, he said the men had been freed as part of a
calculated effort to demonstrate good faith in
dealing with the insurgents. Of course, both sides
share the objective of avoiding a civil war.
One senior Baathist talking about the Americans said
to me, recently, "In the 1980s we were allies, how
did we end up on opposite sides?" The Baathists are
secular nationalists, they never allied with al-Qaeda
or hardline Islamists when they were in power, and
they've always been the sworn enemy of the
soon-to-be-nuclear-armed regime in Iran. They share
two of America's main enemies, al-Qaeda and Iran. The
Baathists and al-Qaeda elements who have worked
together in the insurgency have always been
uncomfortable bedfellows. And they've left little
doubt in each other's minds that once the Americans
leave, they'll have to fight each other.
On
the Trial of Saddam Hussein
Saddam's trial is nothing but a distraction. To the
Iraqis, there's no question of Saddam's guilt, or of
the final outcome of the judicial process -- Saddam
will die. The question for them is, why is it taking
so long and why is he being given a platform? For
whose benefit is this trial being run? For Western
domestic consumption; it's for the international
community. It's not the healing or reconciliation
process for Iraqis some might like to make it out to
be. Saddam has been the dominant figure in the
courtroom and the political winner.