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ANDERSON COOPER: Well,
the testimony today was met by deep skepticism, both
at home and here in Iraq.
A new CNN/Opinion Research poll shows that only 40
percent of people surveyed believe the surge is
working. Fifty-four percent say it is not. Last
month, 43 percent of people said they trusted General
Petraeus to report what is going on. Fifty-three
percent said they did not.
And, according to a poll done by three other news
networks, six in 10 Iraqis say security has actually
gotten worse since the surge.
For some perspective, we are joined by CNN's Michael
Ware and Michael Gordon of "The New York Times."
Michael Ware, the Bush White House has repeatedly
said that al Qaeda in Iraq is the most significant
enemy the U.S. is now facing. They have often
portrayed the battle as a simple one, really, between
America and al Qaeda terrorists. That message
certainly seemed to contradict what -- or was
contradicted by what General Petraeus said today.
MICHAEL WARE, CNN CORRESPONDENT: Yes, that is very
true, Anderson.
Indeed, if you speak to commanders here on the
ground, if you speak to senior diplomats here on the
ground, whilst they acknowledge that al Qaeda remains
at the forefront of some of the more clinical
military operations, they admit, candidly, that the
greater problem is Iranian influence, as they see it.
Indeed, as one top U.S. official said to me, the
winner of the last six years is Iran. And, finally,
members of the administration are waking up to that.
And that is, indeed, reflected in the testimony today
that Iran is the major problem now for the long term
and, indeed, in the immediate term -- Anderson.
COOPER: Michael Gordon, General Petraeus said the
military surge is basically meeting its military
objectives. But wasn't the true objective of the
surge originally to allow national political leaders,
Iraqi leaders, time to reconcile? And that part has
largely been a failure.
MICHAEL GORDON, CHIEF MILITARY CORRESPONDENT, "THE
NEW YORK TIMES": Well, the purpose of the surge
originally was to set the security conditions, as you
point out, for political reconciliation. And they
have made progress in reducing the levels of
violence, by most objective measures.
But that is a necessary but not sufficient condition
for the success of the surge. It is intended to
enable a political solution. And that has yet to be
accomplished.
COOPER: And why, Michael Gordon, is that so hard? Is
it -- yeah, basically, why is it so hard for Iraqi
political leaders to come to some sort of
reconciliation, if all outside observers seem to be
saying, that's the only way forward?
GORDON: Well, I think the Shiites have the upper hand
in Baghdad, and I don't think they are inclined to
relinquish control. They're deeply suspicious of the
Sunnis. The Sunnis were disenfranchised in some of
the previous elections, because they didn't
participate.
But, you know, there is a positive element, which is
the ground-up element, to work with the Sunni tribes
and the former insurgents. So, the top-down part of
the puzzle is not working out very well, but the
bottom-up side of it is working better than
anticipated.
COOPER: Michael Ware, Petraeus said that as many as
30,000 troops could leave by the beginning of next
summer. It was sort of presented as though that was
an operational decision.
In truth, it's really an operational necessity. The
U.S. can't maintain these current troop levels,
without putting even more strain on our already
strained troops. Is that correct?
WARE: Yes, that is correct, Anderson. In fact, I'm
struck by the way people are regarding General
Petraeus' discussion of those troop levels until July
of next year. People are acting like he has just
announced some sort of phased withdrawal. Well, no,
not at all. That was the timeline for the so-called
surge from the beginning.
Indeed, it wasn't a surge. It was a one-year
escalation of U.S. forces. And the clock was due to
run out on that escalation in the summer of next year
anyway. So, that is not a revelation at all.
COOPER: Michael Gordon, there has been a lot of
argument over the statistics that General Petraeus is
using. In 2006, the bipartisan Iraqi Study Group said
that there had been -- and I quote -- "significant
under-reporting of violence by the U.S. military" and
pointed that -- quote -- "A murder of an Iraqi is not
necessarily counted as an attack."
If that was happening back then, according to the
Study Group, why should people believe the numbers
that the military are using now?
GORDON: Well, people can dispute a given number or a
given statistic, but a wide variety of trends point
in the same direction.
For example, there's a non-governmental organization,
Iraq Body Count, which is not necessarily friendly to
the Bush administration, and they show a decline in
August. Iraqi government data shows a decline. The
Brookings Institution has an index which shows a
decline.
What you really have to look at is the broad trends.
But, you know, I don't think that is the key issue.
If you put five combat brigades and 30,000 troops
additional in Iraq, you will get a dampening of the
violence. The key issue is, can this be sustained, as
American troops are reduced over the next nine
months, and can you drive the levels lower, because,
while they're down, they're still high.
COOPER: Michael Gordon, you wrote a remarkable
article in "The New York Times" Sunday magazine last
week about the counterinsurgency efforts.
I want to ask you about the successes in Anbar. Can
they be replicated in other parts of the country? I
know it's already spreading somewhat. And are those
successes, the reaching out to Sunni tribal leaders
to turn against al Qaeda, is that related to the this
called surge, or was that happening independent of
it?
GORDON: Well, the answer is, really, it is a little
of both.
The activity in Anbar was happening prior to the
surge. And this was enlisting the support of the
Sunni tribes against al Qaeda of Iraq. But it is
spread to Baquba, where I was in June. I saw some of
it firsthand. And that is directly related to the
surge, because a lot of the residents were reluctant
to take on al Qaeda until they saw an elevated and
sustained presence of American forces.
And it's beginning to happen south of Baghdad in
areas like Arab Jabour and Horajab (ph). And that,
again, I think, is somewhat connected to the surge,
because it is the additional level of forces that is
giving some of the Sunnis down there the kind of
courage and fortitude to take on al Qaeda.
COOPER: Michael Gordon, we appreciate your reporting,
as always.
Michael Ware -- we are going to have more from
Michael Ware when we come back. He has got an
exclusive report from inside the Sunni insurgency
that used to target Americans and now works with
them, what Michael Gordon was just talking about.
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(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
LT. GEN. DAVID PETRAEUS, US ARMY: We can see that
certain areas that were, in fact, sanctuaries for al
Qaeda far beyond just Anbar Province, but also in
areas south of Baghdad and north of Baghdad, Baquba
and even areas now starting up the Tigris River
Valley, are in fact no longer safe havens for al
Qaeda.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
ANDERSON COOPER: As we pointed out earlier, the
success in getting Sunni tribes to turn against al
Qaeda started in Al Anbar Province. And the change
there has been dramatic.
CNN's Michael Ware got exclusive access to one of the
reasons why. Take a look.
(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)
MICHAEL WARE (voice-over): We are driving through
Baghdad streets shortly after dawn. American-allied
Sunni insurgents have agreed to smuggle us into Al
Anbar Province, where just months ago, al Qaeda was
in control.
(on camera): We are now beyond the capital, Baghdad,
on the way to our linkup with the nationalist
insurgents. To get this far, we've had to pretend to
be Sunni and Shia as we pass through al Qaeda-
controlled areas of the city and areas controlled by
the Shia Mahdi militia.
(voice-over): Soon, an insurgent commander is guiding
us along dirt roads bound for the small town of Zorba
(ph), an al Qaeda headquarters for three years only
recently overthrown.
Groups of gunmen in civilian clothes keep watch. The
street is busy. Shops are open. A few months ago, it
was not like this. Tribal elders once targeted by al
Qaeda now move freely among the gunmen.
"There was no life here, because al Qaeda dominated
the area," says this elder, Sheik Mohammed. "They
were killing people. All the markets were closed."
Al Qaeda also slaughtered the town's policemen, but
now the police chief coordinates with these gunmen.
And, soon, many will join his ranks in uniform.
"Right here, in this place, al Qaeda hung people's
heads from butcher's hooks," he says.
Though the tribes fought fierce battles with al Qaeda
fighters, he says help from the government in Baghdad
never came.
"The government doesn't exist here. It is against us,
and against all of our operations in the area."
(on camera): What would have happened to me if I was
here four months ago?
(voice-over): "Al Qaeda would have separated your
head from your body," he answers.
That won't happen now, because of this man. His name
is Abu Ahmed (ph). Behind the sheiks, the police
officers and all the gunmen, he is the one in charge,
a renowned guerrilla commander who led the fight
against al Qaeda. It is his protection that is
keeping us alive. We drive with him to see his
recruits being trained at a remote U.S. Marine police
training school.
It is clear he is well known, and it is his men being
trained.
CORPORAL TIMOTHY COFFMAN, U.S. MARINE CORPS: We teach
them a lot of our tactics. And we get them -- get
them, you know, pretty damn -- pretty damn good.
WARE (on camera): Yes.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: We gave them weapons.
(CROSSTALK)
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Yes.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Give them weapons, uniforms.
WARE: We were at one of the checkpoints with the
volunteer forces. What's the nature of those forces?
COFFMAN: Well, those are basically, like, local
militia.
WARE (voice-over): The cooperation is paying off,
says Coffman. Attacks here are dramatically down.
Across Al Anbar, attacks used to peak at over 100 a
week. They're now down to about seven. At
checkpoints, Abu Ahmed's gunmen have fluorescent
bands and identity cards from the Marines, plus
banners, so U.S. aircraft don't strike them. It is a
delicate accommodation.
"The insurgents will never stop until they liberate
Iraq," Abu Ahmed says in front of the former al Qaeda
headquarters. "We respect them, and, God willing,
they will liberate Iraq. We are all against the
occupation and for the establishment of a national
Iraqi government."
Fears in Baghdad and in America of U.S. troops
supporting armed groups opposed to the government are
not unfounded.
Abu Ahmed insists that, "If our demands are not met
by our petitions and by demonstration, then we will
carry weapons and defend our Iraq."
But he can only defend us to the edge of his
territory.
(on camera): Is this goodbye?
(voice-over): A reminder that al Qaeda is not far
away, as we leave for Baghdad.
(on camera): This is now the most dangerous part of
the trip...
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Yes.
WARE: ... going home, because we have been exposed
here for a few hours. Al Qaeda could most likely know
that we are here. And, without our insurgent escorts,
this is the time they will strike.
What's wrong?
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: There's a checkpoint.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: That's a checkpoint.
WARE: Oh. Hide the camera.
(voice-over): We make it through that checkpoint,
leaving America's success story behind.
(END VIDEOTAPE)
COOPER: Amazing report there, Michael Ware, who joins
us now from Baghdad.
Michael, I want to read you a question that columnist
David Brooks asked in "The New York Times" last week.
He said, "The crucial question now is, do these
tribes represent proto-local governments, or are they
simply regional bands arming themselves in
anticipation of a cataclysmic civil war?"
What do you think the answer to that is?
WARE: Well, it's a little bit of both, Anderson.
Certainly, this is how, say, for example, western Al
Anbar Province is being governed. It is from these
tribes that come the chief of police, that come the
local town major, and that eventually comes the
provincial council. So, these are the fundamental
building blocks of the local government.
At the same time, there is a flavor of warlordism
about this. And that is what America is now
harnessing, not just to attack al Qaeda, but to curb
what U.S. military intelligence says is the heavy
Iranian militia influence inside the central
government.
COOPER: And are these tribal groups willing to work
with the central government in Baghdad, the Shia-
dominated government, and vice versa? Is the
government of al-Maliki willing to work with these
Sunni tribes?
WARE: The answer is no on both counts, Anderson.
These guys made it very clear to us on this day and
on other days when I have contact with other groups,
they are opposed to the Maliki government and any
government that they believe is beholden to Iranian
influence, a belief shared by many within the U.S.
mission. So, these are anti-government forces that
America is supporting against the government it
created. And, certainly, within the Iraqi government,
they believe that this is America building Sunni
militias to act as a counterbalance to their
influence -- Anderson.
COOPER: Fascinating developments. Michael Ware,
appreciate the reporting.