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Length: 11:12
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP, "THE
DAILY SHOW WITH JON STEWART")
JON STEWART, HOST, "THE DAILY SHOW": So, we can't set
a deadline, but our commitment is not open-ended.
Basically, what he is saying is, we are definitely
leaving Iraq some time between now and the end of
time.
(LAUGHTER, APPLAUSE)
STEWART: Wait, wait, wait. Not the end of time. I
don't want to give a date.
(LAUGHTER)
(END VIDEO CLIP)
ANDERSON COOPER: Well, Jon Stewart can't do it, but
Congress can.
The House passed it last week. And as we mentioned,
earlier today Senate lawmakers joined in passing a
war spending bill that includes a deadline, March 31
of next year. It was close, 51-47, with Republicans
Gordon Smith and Chuck Hagel voting yes.
It is not a veto-proof majority, obviously. And
President Bush promises to use the veto pen.
But it still raises serious questions about what a
pullout would look like if and when the orders do
come, and what it would mean to the mission and the
war.
CNN's Tom Foreman takes a look.
(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)
TOM FOREMAN, CNN CORRESPONDENT (voice-over): Meeting
a deadline for withdrawing from Iraq would be a
monumental task. And the numbers tell the tale;
143,000 U.S. troops are there right now, soon to be
160,000. And they don't travel light.
The military has tens of thousands of airplanes,
tanks, helicopters, Strykers, and other vehicles.
There are an estimated 14,000 armored Humvees in Iraq
alone.
(on camera): And all of these forces, all of this
equipment are spread all over the country. True,
there are concentrations -- for the Army, in Baghdad;
for the Marines, out in Anbar Province -- but
American troops, in some number, are still
everywhere.
So, how would the military leave all this territory?
Analysts say, in all likelihood, some of the troops
would fly directly out of Baghdad's main airport. But
most of them would come out the way they went in:
traveling south to Kuwait, and then getting on to
ships.
(voice-over): The American military, working with
Iraqi troops, would establish heavily-guarded areas
around the exit routes. But it would be perilous.
Just as it happened in Vietnam, some military
analysts say, even if withdrawal is desired, a
publicly acknowledged date would permit the enemy to
dog the departure and stack up American casualties
every step of the way.
MAJOR GENERAL DONALD SHEPPERD (RET.), CNN MILITARY
ANALYST: I have seen this movie before. I can't think
of anything dumber than announcing ahead of time to
the enemy what you're going to do. It provides them
with the opportunity to basically control the
situation.
FOREMAN: It is not clear what will happen to the
bases or the endless tons of equipment that will
certainly be left behind, too worn out to be brought
back.
Even with the deadline, however, the Pentagon
suggests, leaving Iraq would not take not days, or
weeks, but months.
Tom Foreman, CNN, Washington.
(END VIDEOTAPE)
COOPER: Some perspective now on the repercussions of
a pullout, or even the prospect of a pullout.
With us tonight, CNN military analyst retired
Brigadier General James "Spider" Marks, along with
Steven Simon of the Council on Foreign Relations,
and, in Baghdad, CNN's Michael Ware.
Good of all of you to join us.
Steven, you believe the U.S. should withdraw forces
by the end of '08, beginning of '09. You think the
Democrats' timetable is too quick.
Critics say, as you heard in that piece, that a
deadline gives our enemy a blueprint, a timeline to
work off and plan for. Doesn't -- does that not
matter?
STEVEN SIMON, SENIOR FELLOW FOR MIDDLE EASTERN
STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS: Well, at some
point, a deadline is going to be put forward.
And it only makes sense for the United States to plan
towards a deadline, so that it approaches withdrawal
in a systematic and orderly way and doesn't
contribute to perceptions already reigning in the
region that the U.S. has been defeated. You need to
avoid the perception of a rout.
COOPER: General Marks, you're against any kind of a
deadline. Why?
MARKS: Well, I don't think a timeline does much good.
Look, let's be frank with each other here. If we
acknowledge that there's a timeline for departure --
I spent my life as an intelligence officer and as a
professional officer, trying to get into the shoes of
the bad guy and try to look at us the way that we do
business.
If I set a timeline and I'm the bad guy, I go to
ground. I start giving you all the indicators that
things are really pretty calm. I reinforce the
decision that it's time to pull out; things are
looking good. And at the exact moment, I choose the
time to engage, as we start -- as the United States
starts to pull out of the theater. It's just a bad
scenario.
COOPER: Michael, there are some who say that
President Bush can use the very threat of a deadline
to try to pressure Prime Minister al-Maliki and
motivate the Iraqi government to get their act
together, not to depend on, you know, a definite U.S.
presence. Could that work?
WARE: Well, that's one of the falsehoods, I think, of
the deadline thinking, Anderson. I mean, Prime
Minister Nuri al-Maliki is already under enormous
pressures from all sorts of areas. He knows he's
already virtually on borrowed time, as it is.
Plus, he's also realistic enough to know that these
deadlines aren't real, even if they are set. So, they
really don't become a stick to beat him with anyway.
COOPER: General Marks, one of the key military
strategies is clear and hold, try to get rid of the
insurgents in a city, keep them out.
Critics say, look, you look at Tal Afar, a city in
northern Iraq. That was cleared in the past, to once
again get rocked by violence. Why didn't it work
there?
MARKS: We didn't hold. In Tal Afar, we didn't hold.
It's clear, hold and build. And the build process
requires preconditions of hold. You've got to have
forces on the ground. They have to be there routinely
setting the conditions.
That's why things like the conditions in Tal Afar
went south. It's because of the numbers and it's the
presence.
You try to establish -- and Michael's living this
right now. He understands what a new normalcy can
look like. He understands how things can get rocked
very easily. You've got to establish a normalcy,
where the normal family in Iraq feels like a certain
element of security exists and they can get about
business on a daily basis. You don't do that, the bad
guys pour back in.
COOPER: Steven, since the U.S. increased security in
Baghdad, violence and casualties are down. I guess
bombings around the capital are up. Is there real
progress? Or are militias, you think, simply laying
low?
SIMON: Well, violence in Diyala province has gone way
up. And attacks against the United States troops
there are still at an all- time high.
So, I really don't think, you know, we can judge
anything about the long term from what is now going
on in the very, very small areas within Baghdad,
where the U.S. troop level has been significantly
augmented. And the Shiite militias, to some extent,
have gone to ground. At the same time, Sunni attacks
are up.
So, look. Let's be frank. This increase in forces is
not sustainable. The president himself has said so.
And the situation in Tal Afar, which we have just
been discussing, is a great example of what happens
when, A, the United States can't sustain the
necessary troop levels. And, B, the Iraqi government
will not go in and actually do the build phase that
was referred to.
The Iraqi government did nothing. The United States
could not convince it to expend any funds in Tal Afar
to back up the work that brave U.S. soldiers had done
there.
COOPER: So, in terms of solutions, Steven, you say
set a deadline and just stick to that deadline, no
matter what happens on the ground?
SIMON: Well, you know, you can never say no matter
what happens. But you need to have a goal. You need
to have a plan.
The elections here in the United States last November
indicated that as far as the U.S. public was
concerned, the kitchen was closed on Iraq. That the
U.S. public wants the U.S. to be out of there.
So, it only makes sense to plan for an orderly
withdrawal before it is forced by a complete collapse
of public support for the war or sudden reverses on
the ground.
COOPER: General Marks, he raises an interesting
point, which is that the timetable that General
Petraeus is talking about, and it makes sense in
terms of letting this thing play out and really
seeing whether or not it's working, but the timetable
that he's been talking about from the get-go, is very
different and is very much at odds with the political
timetable that seems to be being bandied about by
Republicans and Democrats in the United States. At
some point, those timetables have to mesh.
MARKS: Well, you know, the timetables may not mesh.
The U.S. election cycle, moving toward '08, and the
cycle that Dave Petraeus and the great folks on the
ground are trying to achieve in Iraq, and
specifically right now focused on Baghdad, are not
necessarily coincident.
And the issue is, with the bad guys in Iraq, and the
way we have to try to channel our forces and make a
difference there, won't necessarily be affected.
There isn't necessarily a causal link between what's
happening there and preset desires on our Congress,
at this point, or by our Congress.
And I tell you, at the very point that we need
Congress to be quiet, they need to be quiet. And
that's right now. We need to let this plan run its
course.
Two of the five brigades have made it in. The
remaining three won't get there until probably some
time in June. And this is a sense of feel. It's very
tough to measure it and have a scientific assessment.
You've got to have a sense of feel on a
counterinsurgency.
COOPER: Michael Ware, how does it feel on the ground?
WARE: Well, it feels like, here in Baghdad, as we've
seen time and time again, and as we've already
pointed out, that certainly the Shia militias are
simply holding their breath.
With all these extra American troops, and, yes, more
is coming, al Qaeda's suicide bombers are still
getting through. The Shia militias, in terms of their
infrastructure, remain intact.
The Shia militias and their Iranian backers that our
western intelligence points to, still have this
stranglehold on power, here under the democratic
system that America set out.
So, fundamentally, the dynamics that are really
driving this war aren't being addressed. That's why
we're starting to see America cut deals. We're seeing
Maliki cut a deal with Muqtada al-Sadr. And we're
seeing America cutting deals with the Ba'athists out
in the west, to take on the fight for al Qaeda, that
America itself has said it can't win out there.
COOPER: And we're going to -- we're going to talk
with Michael Ware a little bit more about that
particular subject coming up.
And James "Spider" Marks, appreciate it.
Steve Simon, as well.
And Michael, we'll talk to you again. Thanks.
A bit later tonight, some may call it a strange
alliance. Michael was referring to it. A Sunni
tribesman who used to try to kill Americans, now
working with the Americans. It sounds good. But
there's a deadly dark side, as well.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
COOPER (voice-over): From insurgents to allies. They
fight al Qaeda. But some say they've also become
America's unaccountable assassins, given free reign
to break any rule, as long as they get results.
Michael Ware has an exclusive inside look.
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Length: 6:35
ANDERSON COOPER: In Iraq
today, bloody chaos. Bombs killed at least 76 people
in Baghdad; 43 in Diyala Province; 25 bodies were
found, all of them riddled with bullets; some showing
signs of torture.
In all today, upwards of 160 men, women and children
lost their lives. That kind of carnage is making some
Iraqis reconsider who their friends are.
In al-Anbar province, for instance, a number of Sunni
tribes have actually started aligning themselves with
American forces. That's the good news.
It's not quite all, though. There's also another side
to the story, as CNN's Michael Ware found out when he
spent time with fighters that some are now calling
America's assassins.
(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)
MICHAEL WARE, CNN CORRESPONDENT (voice-over): He
looks like an insurgent. He's actually a U.S. ally.
The new face of America's fight against al Qaeda.
"Al Qaeda slaughtered our sheikhs, our children," he
says, "and we will terminate them." By "we," he means
men like these in Iraq's western Anbar Province
manning this checkpoint which, though unofficial, is
supported by the U.S. military.
The men drawn from tribes or their umbrella network,
the Anbar Salvation Council. The tribes have split
their forces. Some to the police, who intone tribal
chants before operations, while others are kept as
private paramilitaries, hit squads, assault teams,
sanctioned by the Iraqi government. Their loyalty
remaining with their sheikhs, all of which suits an
America desperate to crush al Qaeda.
GEN. DAVID PETRAEUS, COMMANDER, MULTINATIONAL FORCES
IN IRAQ: Beyond Baghdad, moreover, a number of tribes
in Anbar Province have in recent months finally said
enough and begun to link arms against extremist
operatives who have kill their sheikhs and sought to
poison their young people's minds.
WARE: Here in Anbar Province, America cannot defeat
al Qaeda with the troops it has. So it's turned to
the tribes, Baathist and nationalist insurgents of
the Salvation Council, virtually contracting out
parts of the battle against al Qaeda to tribal
fighters. The deal is simple: America gives local
leaders free reign as long as they root out and kill
al Qaeda.
Iraqis like villager Abu Miriam (ph) have tired of al
Qaeda. He says his people began fighting U.S. forces,
but foreigners infiltrated their ranks.
"If you talk against them, they let you go at first.
Then come back and behead you later," he says.
These tensions provoked the tribe's Salvation Council
to work alongside U.S. Marines and soldiers.
Its members carry weapons, launch operations against
targets they select, make arrests and conduct
interrogations. All with American acquiescence.
In a September 2006 U.S. intelligence briefing, it
appeared the tribes had been given a license to kill.
"(The tribes) effectively sought out and killed, on a
repeated basis, elements infiltrating from Syria as
well as local elements trying to re-establish." A
U.S. official said. Asked if this was really an
assassination program backed by U.S. forces, Zalmay
Khalilzad answered...
ZALMAY KHALILZAD, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ: We lose no
sleep over the struggle against al Qaeda and the
killing of al Qaeda people.
WARE: The Salvation Council says the U.S. has given
them rifle ammunition -- a claim the U.S. military
does not dispute -- and the Iraqi government given
them 30 vehicles.
The Salvation Council doesn't hide its insurgent
past.
"Most of us carried weapons against the occupiers at
the beginning," says this sheikh. "Then we dropped
them and started a dialogue. But that doesn't mean we
accept the occupation."
Al Qaeda has hit back at the tribes, hard, sending
chlorine bombs, car bombs and suicide bombers in
explosive chest vests against their leaders.
Asked what would become of him if al Qaeda knew he
was talking, Abu Miriam (ph) replied, "I will be
killed. In fact, slaughtered. Slaughtered with a
knife."
(END VIDEOTAPE)
COOPER: Michael, this seems to be just the kind of
thing that I remember you talking about years ago
that the U.S. wanted to be able to achieve. What kind
of numbers are we talking about? Do we know? I mean,
how successful is this?
WARE (on camera): It's very hard to tell, to give a
sense of numbers. I mean, this is obviously a closely
guarded secret. The tribes, it's in their interest to
inflate their numbers. It's also in the U.S.
military's interest for the tribes to be seen as more
powerful than they really are.
Don't forget, U.S. Marines intelligence only last
year said that al Qaeda in fact dominated the social
fabric of that entire province. So it's going to take
something to wrest that back. And it's far too early
to tell if it's working. But at the end of the day,
this is how America is going to get its troops out of
this country. America cannot win. So this part of the
political solution we hear the generals talking
about, cutting deals with people like these Baathist
insurgents and ultimately people like Iran and the
groups that Iran supports.
COOPER: And just so everyone's clear, what these
Baathists insurgents have against al Qaeda is what?
That they don't like the tactics, they feel too many
of their sheikhs were getting killed?
WARE: Well, these Baathist insurgents were saying
back in 2003, before they even began working with al
Qaeda, they said, "why are we on opposite sides of
this fight? We were allies in the 1980s against Iran.
We both continued to still oppose Iran. Under Saddam,
we never let al Qaeda in. We don't share their
Islamic agenda. And for us, this is a global fight.
We have more in common than we have that divides
us."
Indeed, the Baathists were saying back then, they
were prepared to host U.S. bases. Yet back then the
ideology from the Bush administration was that these
fellows have no place in a new Democratic Iraq. Well,
we still don't have a Democratic Iraq, and these
fellows are still out there.
COOPER: Michael Ware, appreciate the reporting.
Thanks Michael.