GPS: "This is a mission
both politically and militarily in crisis."
Sunday, September 13, 2009
Length: 11:31
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SMALL (14.4 MB)
In an interview recorded Thursday, Fareed
Zakaria asks Michael to evaluate the American
mission in Afghanistan, compare it to Iraq, and
discuss the close call with the IED last week.
FAREED
ZAKARIA: CNN's Correspondent Michael Ware has just
spent a week in the dangerous Afghan city of
Kandahar, the birthplace of the Taliban. He grew a
beard, wore Afghan dress, spent time with local
warlords, went on night patrols with the Afghan
police, all in an effort to get a real sense of how
strong the Taliban is and how successful the military
mission over there.
Michael, let's start with the heart of this - your
assessment. How is it going?
MICHAEL WARE, CNN INTERNATIONAL CORRESPONDENT: Very,
very badly, Fareed. This is a mission both
politically and militarily in crisis. Politically,
this nation is in limbo. They don't even have
finalized results for the outcome of last month's
presidential election because the result counting has
been bogged down in a storm of substantive corruption
allegations. That alone, no matter who is the winner,
is going to strip the next administration of the
legitimacy the American mission here was so
desperately hoping the election would deliver.
Militarily, the entire war plan is up in the air and
under review, and for good reason. On the ground,
there's simply not enough US or coalition, NATO
troops, Afghan troops, Afghan police to put a
significant dent in the Taliban war machine. Even
what we dub as "Obama's War," this massive offensive
in Helmand, is doing very little to the Taliban
infrastructure. The Americans and the British there
combined moving into Helmand are simply taking a
small bite of what is really a very big apple down
there in the south, and in no way is it affecting the
Taliban's command and control system or its broader
bases or supply systems.
So this really is a mission in crisis - Fareed.
ZAKARIA: Michael, you were in Iraq around the time of
the surge. Make some comparisons. What is the Afghan
army strike you like compared with the Iraqi army in
2006, 2007?
WARE: Well, there's absolutely no comparison. As
flawed or as challenged as the Iraqi army might be,
it is light years ahead of the Afghan National Army.
The Afghan National Army is many, many, many years
away from being able to stand up on its own two feet,
even if America stayed in the country to underwrite
it, as we're seeing in Iraq. That's simply not going
to happen any time soon.
However, we may soon see America drawing upon its
lessons from Iraq. What we have here now in
Afghanistan is a situation where we may look at the
development of US-backed tribal militias who will go
and fight the Taliban in the areas where America
cannot fight. Now, militarily, these militias act as
a force multiplier. They add to the projection of
power of the American forces, simply by weight of
numbers. In terms of local knowledge, they are
unparalleled and can do far more than any foreign
troops. They'll also not only have much greater
ability at attacking that Taliban war machine and
starting to put some kind of a crimp in it, it will
also be a form of confrontation between the United
States and the Pakistani Intelligence Agency that
allows the Afghan Taliban to take sanctuary in
Pakistan - Fareed.
ZAKARIA: Michael, I agree with you. I think that is
the key here, which is to replicate that element of
the surge which was to draw -- to divide the enemy,
to draw some of these people into -- to start
fighting for the Americans. Why hasn't it happened?
It is something I've asked senior officials and I get
a variety of answers. Some of them blame the Afghans,
they blame Karzai. They say he wants this started by
going to Mullah Omar, which is a non-starter. Some
blame the Americans. They say they're sitting there
waiting for strategic advantage. On the ground, what
does it look like to you? Why aren't we making deals
with locals?
WARE: That has been a spectacular failure here in
Afghanistan, Fareed. I mean, over the past eight
years America has proved particularly inept at
addressing even just the tribal issue. Harnessing the
power of the tribes or at least engaging in a
significant way with them. Yes, America has had its
favorites from the beginning, either warlords or
particular tribes who were attractive to it at the
time of 9/11. However, the situation pre-9/11,
pre-Afghan invasion has changed dramatically --
without surprise -- in these eight years, and America
has been very slow to react to that situation.
I was at ISAF Headquarters just the other day,
sitting down with some of the men addressing this
issue, and I have to say there has been an awakening,
and I think you'll find that some kind of tribal
militia solution that may include some of the old
warlords from the Soviet era who defeated the Russia-
- the Soviet army here in the '80s may become a part
of the solution that General McChrystal offers to
President Obama. Certainly, we have a senior Afghan
government official, an official at cabinet level,
who's confirmed to us that the program has already
begun with pilot programs already underway with
tribes in the south - Fareed.
ZAKARIA: Is there a danger here that these tribes
will use us for their own purposes? What's the
downside of this strategy?
WARE: What, you mean the tribes haven't been using
the Americans since day one to settle old scores, to
mark rivals as enemies, or to have those who are not
in, you know, the chosen tribe's favor left out and
ignored by the American attention? That's not a new
thing. Of course, that's inherent in this solution.
If that were to emerge. But that's inherent anyway.
What I think is the greater problem is that,
tactically, in the short term, significant engagement
of the tribes and the old veterans of the Soviet war,
if they can be turned against the Taliban would be
stunningly successful. However, there will be a high
price to pay going forward in the second and third
tier effects, and that's what needs to be addressed.
How do you manage these guys so they don't get out of
control? How do you accept responsibility? How is
there any kind of accountability? How do you sell it
to the Afghan people, to the international community?
And eventually ordinary Afghans themselves, let alone
the foreigners here, want to see a new state emerge,
and how would the reestablishment of tribal forces or
warlord forces affect that in the long term? So it's
certainly not an easy fix, but it may be the only one
or an important part of the only solution that may
present itself to President Obama, Fareed.
ZAKARIA: You were talking about the Afghan army and
the Iraqi army. I just want to ask you one
supplementary on that, which is American commanders
do tell me...
WARE: I'll take the supplementary.
ZAKARIA: American commanders do tell me that while
the Afghan army is much less disciplined than the
Iraqi army, they're real fighters, that they are
courageous and they will charge up the hill in the
way that a lot of the Iraqi forces would not. Is that
your experience?
WARE: Well, I mean, I'll caveat my answer before I go
on by saying I had seen incredible bravery from Iraqi
soldiers, but by and large you could argue that,
yeah, that's true. I mean, these Afghans, when they
decide to fight, they fight. And it's on their home
turf. That's an important thing, too. So these
Afghans can be fierce. I mean, it's renowned as the
famed graveyard of empires, this nation. And the
current generations are, you know, are proving that
to be true, be they on the Taliban side or on the
government side.
It's about harnessing that energy, that fervor, that
fanaticism, that nationalism. And that's what America
has failed to do. Well, America's rivals in the
region -- particularly Iran and Pakistan -- are old
hands and so adept at playing the tribal game here or
at playing within the Afghan culture and extracting
sometimes the best and sometimes the worst of it.
America has failed to even be in the game, Fareed.
ZAKARIA: Michael, I know you had a near-miss with an
IED, with an improvised explosive device. First of
all, did you have any -- are there any lasting
effects? You can obviously hear me, but what does it
feel like?
WARE: It wasn't my first IED, but it did distinguish
itself. I mean, I was particularly exposed in this
case. I was in the back of an Afghan police gun truck
rather than encased in the armor of an American
humvee or even better, an American Bradley fighting
vehicle. So it was a very raw experience and watching
the tape again of that incident, what struck me is
how quickly it all happened. I mean, this is such a
cliche from someone who comes out of an event like
this, but in my recollection everything transpired
much more slowly.
And yeah, that sort of thing does rattle you in body
and does leave a mark upon you in spirit. But we're
all fine, thank goodness, both the cameraman, Samad
Qasiri, who was with me, and the Afghan police who
were in that truck. Unfortunately, precisely a week
later, just a couple of days ago, we received a call
one evening here in Kabul from the same police unit,
and one week later, on the same road, same patrol,
they were hit again. Unfortunately this time it
shredded the legs of two of the Afghan police and
blinded one of the injured men.
ZAKARIA: Do you feel that going around on these
patrols, you feel more insecure in Afghanistan than
you did in Iraq?
WARE: Not necessarily so, no, because you choose who
you go with. Now, the particular police commander
whose men we were with on that patrol, I've known him
for eight years. And that man has been a police
commander in the birthplace of the Taliban, killing
Talibs, since December 2001. He's survived and
outlasted successive police chiefs and governors, and
he's on the front line and he's still standing. And
there's a reason for that. So you choose who you go
with very, very carefully. But, you know, there's
risk inherent with all of this. I mean, there was
risk when I'm embedded with US forces, be it the
Battle of Fallujah, be it the invasion of Iraq, be it
the Battle of Tal'Afar, be it the Battle of Samara.
There's inherent risk when I am with Afghan forces
over here or coalition troops. I mean, there's
inherent risk when you're operating independently, as
we do. Unfortunately it's just part of the business
-- Fareed.
ZAKARIA: Well, keep choosing wisely, Michael, and
stay safe. And thank you very much.
WARE: Insha'allah, as they say, mate. Inha'allah.
ZAKARIA: Thank you, Michael. Appreciate it.