TIME: Taunts From the
Border
Monday, October 28, 2002
By MICHAEL WARE / PAKTIA
It was an impressive show of force. Under the cloak of
darkness last week, Chinook and Black Hawk choppers
dropped an entire battalion of 520 U.S. paratroopers
into a remote valley in Afghanistan, just across the
border from the rugged mountains of Pakistan, where
al-Qaeda has re-established training camps. With dogs
barking, cows chewing and a watchful camel resting, the
heavily armed U.S. force trudged through irrigated
fields and muddy Pashtun villages--cordoning off a
3.5-mile-long area and searching each of 150
residential compounds that dangle off the nosebleed
hillsides by the Kakh and Khardala rivers. "We aim to
get the maximum number of people on the ground at
once," says Major Mike Richardson, paratroops
operations officer. "It gives us shock value."
But on this particular occasion, the value was limited.
Two complexes suspected of being al-Qaeda staging posts
were discovered with caches of hundreds of
rocket-propelled grenade rounds, mines and ammunition,
but the enemy was nowhere to be found; the most
threatening local seemed to be an old woman carrying a
hatchet over her shoulder and complaining about her
uninvited guests.
For the battle-ready members of the Army's 82nd
Airborne Division, such small victories, as frustrating
as they may be, will have to suffice. That's because
the troops areconfined behind Afghanistan's border with
Pakistan, unable to reach the concentrations of
al-Qaeda survivors safely ensconced in camps in the
mountains surrounding the town of Mirim Shah. From
these retreats in Pakistan, al-Qaeda commanders can
send out specially trained teams to lob rockets at U.S.
bases and air fields. The most U.S. forces can do is
disrupt the endless teams of terrorists popping into
Afghanistan, closing off their transport routes and
seizing weapons and equipment stashed for them by
abettors inside the country. "This is the type of
warfare that many folks don't have the patience to
fight. Hell, I don't know if I'm patient enough," says
Lieut. Colonel Martin Schweitzer, battalion commander.
In some ways, the U.S. may be using forces too big for
their own good. In snippets of conversations
intercepted by U.S. intelligence, al-Qaeda leaders have
instructed cell members simply to lie low when
Americans descend because "there's too many of them."
Says Colonel James Huggins: "They won't confront us in
our superior numbers," which makes them almost
impossible to see.
In theory, the government of Pakistan's President
Pervez Musharraf is committed to routing al-Qaeda
elements from redoubts within Pakistan. But Islamabad
holds little sway in the tribal regions of the
northwestern frontier, which are largely autonomous and
which just voted in district governments with Islamist
agendas.
The Pakistani Frontier Corps, which is responsible for
guarding the border, is a ragtag, disorganized militia
that isn't even part of the country's regular army or
security forces. Recruited locally and often unpaid,
Corps members are susceptible to al-Qaeda bribes. U.S.
intelligence material suggests that the Corps has been
infiltrated by al-Qaeda, with the terrorists sometimes
donning their uniforms and venturing into Afghanistan.
There is also growing evidence that al-Qaeda members
have been posing as Afghan government troops to get
around and attack U.S. patrols.
Some U.S. commanders think it is only a matter of time
before the U.S. has to launch its own combat missions
inside Pakistan. Until that happens, some think the
military should consider using small squads of around
10 men to "bait them out," as one soldier suggested to
another in a creek bed during the recent operation,
adding, "Heck, I'll be bait." That, of course, might
result in U.S. deaths, which could prove a propaganda
victory for al-Qaeda. "You want to chase down every one
of them, but do you want todo that on their terms or
yours?" asks paratroops intelligence officer Captain
Patrick Willis. Lately, it's not clear which side is
dictating the terms, or even winning the battle.