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FAREED
ZAKARIA, HOST, GLOBAL PUBLIC SQUARE: I've called in
some experts and colleagues to help me understand
what Foreign Minister Mottaki had to say, and we'll
talk about other important international
developments, as well.
Joining me now, the scholar Vali Nasr of Tufts
University; CNN's chief international correspondent,
Christiane Amanpour; and CNN's Baghdad correspondent,
Michael Ware.
Welcome to all of you.
Vali, what was the bottom line from that interview
you took with Mottaki?
VALI NASR, TUFTS UNIVERSITY: Well, some of it was
standard Iranian response to various things, but some
of it was new.
It was clearly a very new tone, an interest in
reopening at least talking about talking, which
seemed to have stopped, sending clear signals that
perhaps Iran is not interested in attacking Israel
imminently, although it is not backing away from its
position regarding comments it's made about Israel's
right to exist, et cetera.
And that it also would like to maybe engage the U.S.
on Afghanistan, engage the United States on Iraq. And
it would like to back away the United States from
contemplating military action, and create some more
room for Iran to continue to follow the diplomatic
line that it has.
So, I would say a lot of it was a charm offensive.
But within it, it had strains that the U.S. or the
Europeans could pick on, in order to see how serious
Iran is actually about talking.
ZAKARIA: Christiane, I was struck by how many times
he praised Solana and the E.U. proposal as
constructive, new in its modalities, new in its
substance.
What did you make of it?
CHRISTIANE AMANPOUR, CNN CHIEF INTERNATIONAL
CORRESPONDENT: Well, I've just learned from Western
diplomats here in Europe connected with this -- he
wouldn't say publicly the proposal -- but I've just
learned that it contains the following: that the
E.U., Javier Solana, in an undisclosed proposal so
far, has agreed to allow Iran what it wants to do,
which is to continue its enrichment at the current
level. In other words, it's somewhere around 3,000
centrifuges -- not to add to the 3,000 centrifuges,
but to still allow it to continue enriching at that
level for the next six weeks, or for a period of six
weeks.
In return for that, the E.U. will promise not to
engage in, or request from the U.N., any further, any
new sanctions for the period of six weeks. And this
will enable what you heard him say, which was talks
about talks.
So, that is the news of what's going on with this new
proposal.
Of course, what it does is allow Iran to continue at
this level of enrichment. And as you know, if you've
been picking up all the signals from Iran over the
last several years, their raison d'etre in this
nuclear program has been to win the international
right to actually enrich. And that is what they think
that they have now secured.
ZAKARIA: But the proposal I thought was published,
because certainly the one I saw did not mention this
twist that...
AMANPOUR: Correct.
ZAKARIA: ... that you have mentioned. So, there was a
secret part to it.
AMANPOUR: Well, this is what I'm told.
You heard Mottaki talk about a letter, and you heard
him not talk about the actual proposals. So, this is
what a Western diplomat is saying.
But of course, this is between the E.U. and Iran.
This is what was presented, according to this Western
diplomat. It is not between the United States and
Iran, although I'm told that the U.S. has given tacit
agreement to this.
This is not negotiations. This is not about the full
resolution of the nuclear program. This is about the
talks before the formal negotiations.
And those formal negotiations, according to both the
United States and the E.U., require a suspension of
their enrichment. And that as yet -- well, we haven't
got to that point yet.
ZAKARIA: Michael Ware, I was struck by the fact that
he repeated his public opposition to the Status of
Forces Agreement. That seems as though it was a very
clear, public Iranian position. They could be saying
this privately. They have been saying it.
What's going on here? Why is this so important to
them?
MICHAEL WARE, CNN BAGHDAD CORRESPONDENT: Well, in
many ways, this agreement, should it be struck, is
going to be a very useful barometer to guide us as to
the success or failure of the U.S. mission.
I mean, look, let's face it. From the moment the
first American tank crossed the Kuwaiti border and
the Saudi border to march on Saddam's Baghdad,
America was, by default, at war with Iran.
Now, the only problem is, Iran knew that, but America
did not. America didn't start waking up to this until
2006, when it started to create its amendment to the
campaign plan, countering Iranian influence.
So, Iran's gains had already been secured. It's in a
position of strength.
ZAKARIA: But I heard, Michael, that Iran has been
having some trouble with the government recently,
which is one of the reasons...
WARE: Of course they will.
ZAKARIA: ... they've been supporting Sadr for a
while.
WARE: Oh, of course they will.
ZAKARIA: The visit with -- Ahmadinejad's visit to
Iraq did not go well.
So, clearly, they're also searching for some degree
of control, which is maybe why they're publicly
saying, "Guys, don't sign this."
If they sign the Status of Forces Agreement, will
that be a defeat for Iran?
WARE: No, it won't be. It'll depend on two things.
One is the terms themselves.
And there's a couple of key issues to look at there,
to gauge the level of Iranian influence. And I would
point primarily to the fate of the Iraqi National
Intelligence Service.
Right now, technically, it's not even on the table.
This is Iraq's CIA. But it's owned, funded, operated
by America's CIA. It doesn't answer to Maliki.
In the meantime, Iran has helped the Iraqis set up
their own competing intelligence agency. Under SOFA,
whatever happens to the INIS is going to be a key
indicator of who has the real influence.
ZAKARIA: Vali, I was also struck by his comments on
Israel. Without renouncing what Ahmadinejad has said,
without negating it, he seemed to be signaling, look,
we have no intention of attacking Israel.
Would that be a fair interpretation?
NASR: Yes. I thought that what he was saying very
clearly is that Iran would not attack Israel unless
it is attacked first. But he also did not want to
distance himself from what has already been said.
I think domestically, it is not possible for the
Iranians to easily or brazenly move away from the
rhetoric. And also, on the Arab street, Iran has made
some gains by its very strong, anti-Israeli position,
which I thought he still was playing to.
You clearly see the dilemma of the Iranian regime in
Mottaki's comments, that when they want to come to
the middle in order to engage the West, how do they
move away from their own revolutionary rhetoric
without losing the political capital that goes with
it?
So, it's a balancing act.
ZAKARIA: Christiane, there is this kind of internal
balancing act you sometimes feel when you're
listening to Iranian diplomats, where they're
positioning themselves in part to address domestic
criticism or comments.
Did you pick up any of that listening to him?
AMANPOUR: Well, yes, I mean, clearly, in the comments
about Israel. But I'd slightly disagree.
I mean, you have -- I've interviewed Ahmadinejad.
Other people have interviewed Iranian officials.
They've never actually said they're going to go out
and launch an attack. I mean, they've always sort of
couched it in this, you know, this is an illegitimate
regime. They've always sort of said that.
In view of the current nuclear negotiations, what's
really interesting is that it has been now discussed
quite a lot, according to reports from inside, on
Iranian state television. It's been discussed more
openly perhaps than it has been before, less
belligerently than it has been before.
And if you remember -- and he mentioned Mohamed
ElBaradei of the IAEA. A couple of years ago, maybe
more than a couple of years ago, this kind of
proposal was on the table. And at that time, it was
just 20 centrifuges. It was, Iran just wanted an
R&D, a slight experimental, let's have strict
verification, and let's proceed. But, of course, the
United States said forget it, nothing unless they
suspend uranium enrichment.
And now it appears we're at more than 3,000
centrifuges, and perhaps they're going to go back to
this formulation that Mr. ElBaradei had more than two
years ago.
ZAKARIA: Michael, you see them up close in Iraq. One
of the things people are trying to figure out:
Fundamentally, are they trying to destabilize the
region, or are they just trying to be an important
player in it?
WARE: They want to have influence over the region.
Now, they'll use instability when it suits. They'll
use support when that benefits them.
I mean, the Iranians have proved to have a very
savvy, strategic mind. They're not of one ilk. They
know how to use the carrot and the stick.
I mean, let's just take Iraq as a microcosm. These
Iraqi militias that are trained and armed and
equipped in Iran, supported by Iran, their attacks go
up and down, as though someone is turning on and off
a faucet for the attacks.
And this is their form of dialogue, not just with the
Americans, but with the region.
And there's nothing anyone can do to stop them on
this issue or on the nuclear issue. America has no
military alternative, and Iran knows that.
ZAKARIA: And we will be back to talk about all this
and more in just a moment.
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ZAKARIA:
And we are back with our panel.
Vali, what do you make of the recent reports about
Israel, Israel planning to strike? I mean there's a
scenario you could concoct, which is, you know,
Israel is striking a deal with Hamas, exchanging
prisoners with Hezbollah, talking to Syria, talking
to Egypt -- and then makes these military maneuvers.
It almost seems as though there's a kind of
diplomatic clearing of the decks, establishing some
goodwill with its other neighbors, and perhaps
preparing for an air strike against Iran.
NASR: No doubt. I mean, there's been a strategy on
the table for a while, of trying to build an Arab
alliance against Iran, that would support military
action or very tough diplomacy against Iran.
Iranians, on the other hand, have been trying to both
bully the Arabs away from such a position, but also
to get their goodwill.
So, there has been a charm offensive with the Arab
world. At the same time, Iranians have threatened
some smaller Arab governments, in case if they
support military action. Or as Michael suggested,
Iraq is obviously a very clear playing ground here.
And therefore, what we're seeing is sort of Israel
now taking this strategy much more seriously, trying
to mend fences, not only with its neighbors --
Hezbollah, Hamas and Syria -- but also more seriously
taking care of the Palestinian problem at a level
that would pacify the Arab street, in Egypt, Jordan
and Saudi Arabia. That then, those regimes could come
out, more forcefully defend tougher action against
Iran.
So, now the ball is in the Iranian court. Can the
Iranians do anything to offset this Israeli
initiative?
And one of the ways in which they do it is this tough
rhetoric against Israel. So, you have a rhetorical
war for the Arab hearts and minds going on.
ZAKARIA: But what I've always thought is you have to
think of the rhetoric the Iranians use on Palestine
as part of a political strategy to gain credibility
on the Arab street.
If you go to the Arab world, I'm struck by the fact
that Ahmadinejad is something of a folk hero in, you
know, Cairo, in Amman. And this is strange -- he's a
Shiite, he's a Persian.
And the reason is, he is seen as a defender of the
Palestinian people in a way that the Arab regimes
can't be, because they are worried about Washington.
NASR: Exactly. And that deficit, Israel is trying to
help with.
In other words, by being more forthcoming on Hamas,
on Hezbollah, and on engaging Syria, they're hoping
to help pacify the Arab street. And that would allow
the Arab governments to come out much more.
And Iran, on the other hand, is trying to both bully
them, as well as try to buy their support as well.
ZAKARIA: Christiane, what do you make of the Israeli
strategy?
AMANPOUR: Well, there are several things here. One,
Ahmadinejad is also a folk hero, if you like, on the
Arab street, because of his opposition to the United
States. And that has played extremely well over the
last several years, of course, with the Bush
administration's policies in the Middle East and in
the Arab and Muslim world.
But I think what's interesting is what Mr. Velayati
has been saying publicly now -- former foreign
minister, very close adviser to the leader, Ayatollah
Khamenei.
President Ahmadinejad has been quite quiet over these
latest proposals, and Velayati has come out and said,
"Look. We need to show the world that we want to
address this diplomatically, because the world -- the
U.S. and its agents," he said, "is trying to say that
we want war. And we need to show the world that we
don't want it, and we need to address this
diplomatically."
Now, in terms of Israel, there were the reports of
its massive military maneuvers over the last several
weeks or so, but also the very real issue of last
September, when Israel went and struck the Syrian,
apparently nuclear, power plant under construction.
And that was termed at that point, and deemed, not
just to take out that plant -- although we'll never
really know what was in that plant, because it's been
bombed -- but also as a message to Iran. And I think
that has been exceptionally clear.
But I think what's really interesting right now is
the different tone that's coming out of Iran.
And look at the tone coming out of the highest levels
of the American military. The chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff has just said that it would be a
high-risk operation that would destabilize the Middle
East. That's not exactly a ringing endorsement for
any attack.
ZAKARIA: Michael, does General Petraeus worry that if
there were to be an Israel or an American strike on
Iran, that what would happen would be Shiite militias
in Iraq would start ramping up the killing of
American soldiers?
WARE: Well, that's clearly one of many ways that
Tehran could respond to a strike.
But let's just think about it. What's the point of a
strike? Do you think Iran doesn't expect it? Do you
think this in any way would actually cripple their
programs or their military?
ZAKARIA: It would delay...
WARE: It does not...
ZAKARIA: Yes, it would delay. It would not destroy...
WARE: Oh, you know, and it would -- it would
consolidate, to some degree, internal support and
external support on the Arab street.
ZAKARIA: Christiane?
AMANPOUR: What's really interesting is an article
that actually a former Israeli foreign minister has
just published, Shlomo Ben-Ami. And he has, basically
in a nutshell, talked about how often the U.S. and
Israel tends to downplay the risks and the
repercussions associated with military action -- as
they did in the case with Iraq in 2003 and subsequent
years -- and they exaggerate the challenges faced
with negotiation and diplomacy.
Look what the U.S. has achieved in North Korea
recently by diplomatic negotiations.
ZAKARIA: Vali?
NASR: I was going to say that, you know, Iran also
has a unique advantage compared to many other
countries in its situation, that it can deflect an
attack by responding not on its own territory or its
own turf, but somewhere else. And in a way have
proxies -- in Lebanon, Palestinian territories, Iraq
and Afghanistan -- bog down the U.S., at least in
terms of subsequent, follow-up attacks.
And there's also all sorts of questions about, you
know, it might be possible for Israel to carry out
the first attack on Iran. But then, what about next
attacks? How is it going to get over Jordan, Egypt,
you know, Turkey, to get to Iranian territory, if
Iran is able to mobilize the Arab street in those
countries?
So, what the attack would do is, more than anything
it's going to change the tenor of relations. In other
words, we have sort of the two countries right now
being aggressive with one another, but within certain
red lines and within certain bounds.
Once you attack Iran, the gloves come off.
And I think the point that Christiane was saying
about Ali Velayati is very important, because
Velayati is now part of a troika, including Iran's
speaker of the parliament, Ali Larijani, who are
going to take Ahmadinejad on in the presidential
elections in June.
And it's not only the U.S. that's going to have a
change of leadership. Iran may well have a change of
leadership.
And people like Velayati do not want a radical change
in context as they go into elections, for the
Iranians to rally to the flag behind Ahmadinejad,
behind the incumbent.
They'd much rather follow the line that Mottaki was
giving today -- let's talk about talking. Let's find
a way to keep the ball rolling, and let's not end up
in a military conflict that then is going to change
the nature of this relationship.
ZAKARIA: So, tensions in Iran will cause rallying
around the flag, which might benefit Ahmadinejad. So,
these guys, for purely domestic reasons, also are
trying to diffuse the tensions.
NASR: Absolutely. I mean, everybody -- they also
would like to be the ones to talk to the United
States. They think Ahmadinejad is toxic. They would
like to have the opportunity to deal with the next
administration.
And there is no doubt, Iranians probably will react
like any other people would, in the middle of a war,
issues of economy, democratic rights, Ahmadinejad's
management style will all fall by the wayside. And
they may rally behind an incumbent, and that would
basically favor him in a presidential election.
ZAKARIA: Michael, bottom line, do you think the
Status of Forces Agreement will go through? Will
there be some deal between the United States and
Iraq?
There has to be. Otherwise, U.S. forces can't stay.
WARE: No, that's not entirely true. I believe, if I
was a betting man, that, yes, there will be some kind
of an agreement. Will it be on terms that America is
entirely happy with? That's the real question,
because there are other routes.
Indeed, the American ambassadors, who are sitting at
the negotiating table, clearly acknowledge the legal
validity of another route. And that's using hangover
legislation from the Coalition Provisional Authority
of Paul Bremer, that allows for the Iraqi government
to go to its own parliament, create its own
legislation, that dictates the terms under which any
foreign force can be present in its country, as any
other nation on the earth can do.
So in essence, they have the choice, or at least to
use as a stick in the negotiations, to jam down the
throat of the next president the conditions in which
he can conduct his war.
ZAKARIA: And we will all be watching this. Thank you
all. Christiane from London, Vali and Michael Ware,
thank you.
We'll be back.