Clip 1 with transcript,
19:29
"I'm nothing more than a witness."
Clip 2 with transcript,
1:53
"It ain't gonna be Rwanda, but it's gonna be Bosnia."
Clip 3 with transcript,
1:56
"This is America turning
on the
government it created."
Clip 4 with transcript,
3:13
"Under the guidelines of every insurgent or militia
group...
journalists fit fairly and squarely as legitimate
targets."
TRANSCRIPTS
CLIP
1
Well, thank you for having me, and let me say at the
outset, in no way do I assume that I have the weight
or the authority of my fellow panelists. I'm nothing
more than a witness. That's all I've done and that's
all I do, I bear witness, in first Afghanistan and
now Iraq. And I've tried to see it from as many sides
as humanly or inhumanly possible, for the purpose of
not just understanding what's happening now and for
deconstructing the myriad of lies, but also to
perhaps one day help feed discussions like this about
what it shall mean and what it shall do.
So what I can offer is perhaps less, in that I can
give you much more of an anecdotal, more empirical
sense of jihad in Iraq, and from that perhaps you can
take from it and begin to decide what that will mean
after Iraq. Because from the outset let me say that
most of what you have been told and most of the
information that you have been given upon which to
form your opinions is wrong. Or is indeed outright
lie or spin or propaganda. I mean, it's a fundamental
truth of war that everybody lies -- their
governments, our governments, the good guys, the bad
guys, even the civilian in the street, who is
enflamed with passion or exaggeration, or it's simply
Chinese whispers. The trick is distilling the truth,
and you can only do that when you can see it with
your own eyes. And in the fog of any war that is
extraordinarily difficult, as you well know, and in
Iraq it's become particularly so.
So let me just tell you a little bit about the Iraq
that I have seen, and that might inform you a little
bit about the jihad of Iraq and what the jihad of
Iraq has become and may mutate into.
I lived in Afghanistan for about a year, which meant
I spent some time in Pakistan, I dealt with the
Taliban, I dealt with foreign fighters, I moved
through Waziristan, the northwest frontier provinces,
and then I shifted into Iran. And Iran was an open
sketchbook for me -- Iraq, sorry. Iraq was an open
sketchbook, I knew nothing about it.
And one of my first encounters was before the
invasion, I was in the north, running free with the
Peshmerga, and from the very beginning there was two
front-lines: one against Saddam but also one against
Ansar al-Islam, which was largely an al Qaeda
affiliate or came from the broad school. And
immediately I thought I was back in Afghanistan. On
that battlefield -- and it really was a battlefield,
it was WWI-type stuff, long running trench-lines, it
was Tora Bora mountain domains, dug-in positions,
unforgiving combatants, suicide bombers, it was
murderous and butcherous. And that was my first taste
and that was before the onset of the invasion.
And then in 2003 I had the misfortune to all but be
there when the first significant car bomb went off in
August 2003 attacking the Jordanian embassy. And then
for better or for worse, friends of mine were killed
in the United Nations Headquarters car-bombing as
well and I stood in that crater while they were
digging out Sergio de Mello.
When I finally arrived in Baghdad after the collapse
of the front line, I knew much from what I had
absorbed from my colleagues about what had happened
on our side of that conflict, of the invasion -- what
the 3rd ID had done, what the Marines had done, the
101st Airborne Division. I really didn't know what
had happened on the Iraqi side. So through a number
of Iraqi characters, some CIA assets, some assets for
other intelligence agencies, and through just people
I knew -- neighbors, translators, drivers, all of
whom, of course, had served in the military -- I
started to seek out the members of Iraq's military
who had fought those battles or had chosen not to
fight those battles and I sought them -- I hunted
them down.
So when I first met them in the summer of 2003, they
were anything from the Corporals to the Lieutenant
Generals, to the senior cabinet ministers who had all
just simply been sent home in disgrace and dishonor
and were sitting in their houses, and at that point I
could talk to them and they were willing to tell me
the story of that war. And I stayed in touch with
these people, and then I watched as they started, bit
by bit, to pick up their Kalishnikovs and take
potshots at American convoys and then I started to
see them gather together and do it more collectively
and then I saw one group begin to coordinate with
another group and then I saw hierarchies emerge and
then I was taken to Iraqi insurgent training camps.
This was at a time when we were being told that they
were dead-enders and criminals and they'd be done by
Christmas.
And I'd see it with my eyes.
Now, at that point, these men -- for want of a better
term -- were, broadly, "nationalists" or they were
men who had been dishonored or they were just
professional soldiers who resented the fact that
foreign tanks were in their streets, entering their
houses, searching their bedrooms, searching their
women, and so forth. And by and large, for the vast
majority of the Iraqi insurgency as we first came to
know it -- the Sunni insurgency, the guerilla war --
that is from whence it came.
Now, these were men who even as they were fighting, I
could spend time with. Now, obviously I received much
criticism for that, but I just wanted to understand.
And I felt the responsibility of history upon me to
do so, because as I said, we were being lied to, and
we're never going to understand it if we don't know
what really happened. We're not going to know what's
coming if we don't really know what happened.
So these were men you could sit, they would smoke
cigarettes, many of them liked whiskey, many of them
liked to carouse, for want of a better term. They
were very much secularists. And slaughtering me and
cutting my head off just wasn't on their radar. Thank
god. And I could sit with their families and so
forth.
It wasn't until the beginning of 2004 -- and by that
time, as I said, Zarqawi was beginning to make his
presence felt; Zarqawi, who was always on the ouster
with old-school classic al Qaeda anyway, with these
bombings and a few other acts of violence. It was
nowhere near the tempo that we've now become so
frighteningly accustomed to. They were still then
unique.
But by the end of 2003, by the beginning of 2004, I'd
be sitting with these same men -- professional
military officers, professional intelligence
officers; Iraq's version of West Pointers and members
of the CIA. These weren't religious fanatics. They
might have been ideologues or they might have been
power-hungry, or they may have been selfish bastards,
but they were not religious fanatics.
And then over a cup of tea one afternoon, I had to
pinch myself to remember I was in Iraq, because
suddenly I thought I was back in Afghanistan. This
same group that I had known for some time suddenly
started pestering me about why wasn't I a Muslim?
They'd never done that. Then I watched as they
prayed. They'd never done that. Then they produced a
video, and I'd seen past videos, and suddenly it was
full of religious iconography and rhetoric and it had
a religious framework, and then there even started to
emerge references to bin Laden and jihad. That was
not in their vernacular when it began.
So I actually witnessed the Islamization or the
radicalization of part -- part -- of the Sunni
insurgency.
Now, as the years went on -- 2004, 2005 -- this
continued, but it really just remained at a certain
element, very angry young men or men from generally
conservative areas, akin to our Bible Belt, who'd
been repressed by Saddam and their mullahs and their
mosques had always been watched and if they got a
little too out of line religiously there were
sanctions brought upon them. So to some degree there
was ripe ground there, but by and large, amongst the
Iraqis in general -- the Sunnis -- and amongst the
Iraqi insurgents, there was not the heart for jihad.
From day one in 2003, the hierarchy of Saddam's
military and intelligence and security apparatus
offered the Americans a deal. What they said was
that, "We never liked al Qaeda. We never had them in
our country. As a regime, we never tolerated them. We
are not al Qaeda. We do not share their agenda for
Islamic jihad or global Islamization. We do not share
their methods and tactics."
They also said, "We're deeply opposed to Iran, as
were you when you were our allies and we used your
satellite imagery to wipe out their divisions."
They said, "We're prepared to host US bases" -- the
verbatim quote was, "akin to Germany and Japan."
"We're more than happy to normalize diplomatic
relations."
And they said, "How did we end up on the wrong side
of this? Don't take us down this road."
At that point, in the early days of the CPA and
Ambassador Bremer, General Sanchez, they weren't just
rebuffed, they were once more dishonored.
So what emerged was a marriage of inconvenience. The
classic case of 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend.'
So you had these professional military officers in
Fallujah during those heady days of the summer of
2004 -- and I was in and out of there a lot, and I
was also with the US military when they retook
Fallujah -- and these two groups were working side by
side, but I can tell you, the assassinations that
went on, the fights that went on, the turf wars that
occurred... it was a very unhappy alliance.
But bit by bit as time went by -- through our fault,
and it must be said through the vision of a man
called Abu Mousab al-Zarqawi, who played the whole
situation like a virtuoso on a violin -- that
changed.
Much of it was about money. The jihadists were NEVER
short of cash. Plus they had an ideological framework
that very readily applied to an angry young man. And
they gained the momentum.
Now, a classic case, very simple illustration.
There's a central part of Baghdad called Haifa
Street. From Haifa Street you can fire mortars on the
US embassy. Haifa Street was the domain of
essentially the Ba'athists, the former military. They
owned it, they ran it. They were the ones who battled
the Americans in those narrow lane-ways. They're the
ones who would fire mortars and rockets at the
embassy and the Green Zone.
Then Ansar al-Islam sent a couple of representatives.
Then Tawhid wal-Jihad, Zarqawi's group, sent a couple
of representatives, and then they started to throw
money around, and then they started to grow. And it
got to the point where suddenly one day during one
fierce pitched battle with the Americans, at the end
of the battle, as the smoke cleared, literally with a
burning American Abrams in the central avenue of
Haifa Street, Zarqawi and the Jihadists took over. So
much so that some of the Ba'athists came to me to
tell me of this, and they feared the rise of the
Islamists. And I said, "Well, how do I know this is
true, I must see it for myself," so they took me in
there. And lo and behold, I drive down that main
avenue and it is lined with Tawhid wal-Jihad flags.
Now, I was then grabbed by what essentially became al
Qaeda, they were preparing to execute me, and it was
the Ba'athists who saved me.
But more and more as time went on, the idea, the
money, the power, the momentum grew and took root.
And yes, al Qaeda came to dominate much of the Sunni
battlefield.
It was after four years, more than 3,000 American
deaths that finally the Americans and the Ba'athists
came to an accord. And what is dressed up as tribal
alliances and civilian volunteers is that America has
cut deals with the Ba'athists that they rejected in
2003, and the Ba'athists are doing exactly what they
promised. Who do you think knows where al Qaeda
sleeps at night? Who is not bound in knots by rules
of engagement and the niceties against assassination
and mutilation and torture? They started it in Anbar
Province, in Ramadi, with an American commander I
know, and it worked. And then it spread.
The surge hasn't done this. Trust me.
Sure, the surge has contributed to helping develop an
environment in the capital, but it hasn't done -- the
success, as it may be, limited or what, against al
Qaeda has come from the deal with the Ba'athists on
the terms they originally offered. And let me tell
you, this is the end note: what was the sticking
point in 2003 and what's now the binding point
between the Americans and the Ba'athists and the
Sunnis at large, and what's also helping to bring
America's pro-Western Arab allies back into alignment
is Iran.
What the Ba'athists said in '03 was, "We're willing
to work with you, but that government is full of
Iran's men and we won't deal with them." And the
Americans said, "Look, any agreements we come to must
be tri-partied. It must include that government." And
the Ba'athists said, "Well, if you want to -- they
are our enemy and they are your enemy. If you don't
realize it, come back when you do." Eventually
America did.
So all these tribal counsels and these police
auxiliaries who are now protecting large chunks of
Baghdad, that's brought these death tolls down, are
American-backed Sunni militias that in part receive
funding and support from neighboring Arab countries
and are essentially a counterbalance to the largely
Iranian-backed or -influenced Shia militias that are
actually the government.
So the anti-al Qaeda success that we're seeing has
come with a price. The building blocks for the proxy
war are now in place. Maybe that will be the buffer
and that will be the balance that remains, but that's
the legacy that we're going to leave. And as the
highest American officials in the country tell me,
Iran is the big winner of this war. America's Arab
allies know that, and the Iraqis know that.
And at the end of the day, the greatest export from
Iraq will be that most of the Iraqi jihadis will stay
in Iraq, and most of the foreigners who go there to
fight, die, because that's why they go. And there's
very little Iraqi leadership at the upper echelons.
When Zarqawi was killed he could have been replaced
by an Iraqi, but he wasn't.
The true power is the idea. And what we didn't have
in Afghanistan, what we didn't have before, was the
internet. They can export this idea with less need
for the veterans to come home to do it. It's the
inspiration that this new breed of jihadi now
represents. Zarqawi forged it in the fire of the war
in Iraq. Osama bin Laden was never comfortable with
it, even Zarqawi's mentor was never comfortable with
it, but we now have a new breed that's harder, more
brutal, and more unforgiving than the al Qaeda we've
ever known, and they're spreading through the
internet. And what helps give them life and what
ultimately the West has used to help limit them is
the Arab world's fear of Iran.
Thanks.
Clip
2
Referring to what a panelist in the earlier session
said, and I mean, obviously it's hard for me to keep
as attuned to the domestic political current here as
I'd like, given that I live in Baghdad -- the bottom
line is, it doesn't matter whether you're for or
against this war, whether you agreed with the way
it's been executed or not: you're stuck. I'm sorry,
you've really screwed it.
Withdrawal now, even a phased withdrawal, will bear
such consequence -- not for us, but for our children
and their children. I can't even begin to imagine it.
And that's not to mention what I call the moral
dilemma for liberal America: okay, we want our boys
and girls home, who doesn't? They want us out, you
can understand that. It ain't gonna be Rwanda, but
it's gonna be Bosnia. And that's what the top war
planners tell me. And you're gonna leave a vacuum,
and take a wild guess who's gonna fill it. And just
think about the proxy war that will be fought.
Now, the previous panelist said that there won't be a
regional war. That's right -- Saudi tanks aren't
going to roll across the border, but everyone's
already playing in Iraq. Everyone's already backing
their horse; arming, funding, politically supporting.
And the minute you drop down to 100,000, 75,000
troops -- that's only enough to keep your boys and
girls alive. They won't be able to affect a thing.
They can barely affect anything now.
It's the horrid reality of our time...because until
we come up with a solution, we're stuck there.
Clip
3
Let me just say General Haq is right -- arming groups
is extraordinarily dangerous. But that's what the
American administration has done with this
government. Even the senior officials on the ground
don't call the Iraqi government their ally. The
arming of the Sunni tribes is a two-fold purpose. The
most immediate is to put pressure on al Qaeda. That
won't wipe them out, you never will, but it returns
them to their natural order: a constant cancer that
one must live with.
But the second, the most significant element, the
broader element of the embracing of these Sunni
tribes is this is America turning on the government
it created. Don't forget, American agencies
recommended the complete disbandment of the Iraqi
national police. Why? Because the Americans have no
control over it, and they are death squads in
uniforms.
The reason why civilian deaths in Baghdad are down
are threefold: one, anyone that can leave has left;
anyone left behind is now in segregated enclaves; and
for a long time the Sunnis were vulnerable. They were
naked. US-backed government death squads would come
in and slaughter them -- drill bits, all sorts of
business -- and dump their bodies. Now these
neighborhoods have their own militias to protect
them. And as American soldiers, as General Petraeus,
as Ambassador Crocker will tell you, they were the
men two weeks ago we were fighting against. But we
give them support -- we give them air support -- and
now their neighborhoods are safe.
So it makes the numbers look good for now, and maybe
it's the only way you'll get your boys and girls
home, but it is gonna have long-term consequences.
Clip
4
We're
here in the National Press Club and so it's
appropriate to ask a question about the role of the
media, and I think, Michael Ware, I'll direct this to
you although ask others for comment. The questioner
writes, "Two clear differences between the Afghan war
--" to which I referred initially -- "and Iraq are
found in the media environment. For one thing, we are
almost two decades along in the 24-hour news cycle,
and there are competing news outlets distributed
worldwide in that cycle, like al-Jazeera, that we
didn't have before. Do these factors actually make
events more combustible or do they shorten the story
arc and cut short the impact of any given set of
events?"
Well, I think they do all those things. I mean, one,
it helps inform much quicker, much more readily. I
mean, goodness gracious, I've been in combat with US
soldiers and we've learned things off the radio or
off CNN in the DFAC or the chow hall before we've
received orders from above. So there's a certain
sense of real-time that helps inform all of us.
Yes, it can also be inflammatory, even if it's true
-- the way it's handled or the timing of its release.
Nonetheless, overshadowing all of these:
please...it's the internet.
I mean, if you want your kind of news, you don't have
to watch CNN or even al-Jazeera. You know the website
to go to. You know where you download your videos.
You know where you can get what you want. I mean, you
know...these are markets. And the markets know what
they want and they know where to go and get it.
And don't forget, you know, there's a lot of
criticism of the media about Iraq in terms of the
good news, the bad news, blah blah blah blah blah.
Well -- A -- unlike any conflict I have ever been in,
I've never been hunted. There's no sense of
journalistic objectivity or neutrality. You're not an
observer. Under the guidelines of every insurgent or
militia group -- and I've been with all of them: I've
dealt with the Quds Force of Iran, I've dealt with
Jaish al-Mahdi, I've dealt with the Badr Brigade,
I've dealt with al Qaeda in Iraq, I've dealt with
Ansar al-Islam, Ansar al-Sunna, I've dealt with
Brigades of 1920 Revolution -- I can rattle them off,
and under all of their targeting guidelines,
journalists fit fairly and squarely as legit targets.
Either because we're part of the problem or because
our propaganda value is so great that it outweighs
all else.
And at the end of the day, none of the actors in
these things need us any more. They don't need us to
get their message out. They think we distort it,
whether it's the US Public Affairs officer who goes
nuts because he doesn't think that the general was
shown in the right light or you showed his bad side
or whether it's al Qaeda, who doesn't think that you
were damning enough of the Americans or that you
downplayed their casualties. Because they have their
own delivery systems.
The world has changed.