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WOLF BLITZER: Welcome
back to "Late Edition." I'm Wolf Blitzer reporting
from Washington.
This week, Iraq's Shiite factions clashed in street
battles that left dozens of people dead, while the
country's Sunni politicians continue to boycott the
government. All this happening as the Iraqi prime
minister, Nouri al-Maliki, is under intense pressure
from Washington to meet major political benchmarks.
For some insight on what's really going on in Iraq,
we turn to three guests: in London, the former Iraqi
government spokesman, Laith Kubba; on the ground for
us in Baghdad, as always, our correspondent Michael
Ware; and here in Washington, The New York Times
chief military correspondent Michael Gordon. He's
also the author of the best-selling book "Cobra II:
The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of
Iraq."
Gentlemen, thanks to all of you for coming in.
Laith Kubba, I'll start with you in London. Can Nouri
al-Maliki survive this political crisis he's facing
right now?
LAITH KUBBA, FORMER IRAQI GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN: I
think he can. He is at the mercy of maybe a handful
of heavyweight political players in Iraq. That is,
the two Kurdish leaders, the leader, Abdul Aziz
al-Hakim, the leader of the biggest Shia block. And I
think so long as those key figures want him to stay
in office and have not developed an alternative to
his premiership, I think he will stay in office. But
the minute they strike a deal, I think this will
change.
BLITZER: All right. Let's bring Michael Ware in.
You've been there for a long time, Michael. In recent
days, the prime minister has made some very defiant
statements about the criticism he's facing,
especially from some politicians here in Washington.
He said this -- he said: "We will pay no attention.
We care for our people and our constitution and can
find friends elsewhere." He also said: "I will not
abandon my legal and legitimate responsibility in
serving Iraq. Neither do I see any legitimate
patriotic reason to resign."
Give us your assessment right now on where he stands,
Michael. Can he do what the U.S. really wants him to
do and mainly crack down on the militias and get
tough and achieve some of those political benchmarks?
MICHAEL WARE, CNN CORRESPONDENT: No. There's very
little chance -- slim to none actually, Wolf -- of
Nouri al-Maliki delivering now or ever. I mean, we
know he's a lame duck prime minister. He has
absolutely no power. It's not even in the interest of
the true power blocs within this government to see
these benchmarks met. They don't share U.S. agendas.
And Nouri al-Maliki, many senior commanders and
American diplomats doubt whether he shares these
agendas. And certainly they all agree that even if he
wanted to, there's simply no way he can deliver.
Nonetheless, we hear Iranian officials here on the
ground in Baghdad telling us that they still strongly
support him and fully intend to see him remain in his
post.
BLITZER: It's interesting, Michael Gordon, that what
-- Michael Ware has been reporting consistently on
this for some time, but in August, the National
Intelligence Estimate had some very similar
assessments: "The Iraqi government will become more
precarious over the next six to 12 months."
It goes on to say: "The level of overall violence,
including attacks on and casualties among civilians,
remains high. Iraq's sectarian groups remain
unreconciled. Al Qaida-Iraq retains the ability to
conduct high-profile attacks. And to date, Iraqi
political leaders remain unable to govern
effectively."
You've spent a lot of time there over these years as
well. You basically agree with that NIE, that
National Intelligence Estimate?
MICHAEL GORDON, NEW YORK TIMES: Well, I think the NIE
did make a pretty correct assessment, but there was
another side to it, Wolf. It also said that if the
U.S. was to withdraw its troops in a pretty short
timeframe, that the security gains that have been
achieved over the past several months would be
forfeited.
BLITZER: And they would be forfeited almost -- some
say within 48 hours or within days if the U.S. were
to start withdrawing or reducing its force structure.
What does that say, though, about the Iraqi military?
KUBBA: Well, it says that the Iraqi military is what
it's been for the last several years: a work in
progress and not really prepared, at this point, to
step up to the plate. So the NIE was pointing to some
security gains, the prospect of more, but also
identified that political reconciliation is not
really advancing.
BLITZER: What about this notion, Laith Kubba, that
Nouri al-Maliki and his colleagues are really
aligned, if you will, at least informally, with the
Iranians?
In that NIE, it also said this. It said: "Over the
next year, Tehran, concerned about a Sunni
reemergence in Iraq and U.S. efforts to limit Iranian
influence, will continue to provide funding, weaponry
and training to Iraqi Shia militants. Iran has been
intensifying aspects of its lethal support for select
groups of Iraqi Shia militants."
As you know, Laith Kubba, seen from Washington, this
alliance between the Iraqi government and the Iranian
government is very disturbing.
KUBBA: There is no question about it, number one,
that the concern is real. But also, I think all Iraqi
politicians know very well that Iraq's neighbors will
play a bigger role in Iraq's future, that ultimately
America will withdraw its troops and the neighbors
are there to stay.
They already have their inroads. That includes, of
course, Iran, I think the biggest player in Iraq
affairs today. And no question, they have their
inroads to many Shia areas.
But having said that, I think highlighting the
concern is one thing. Deciding how to deal with it is
totally another. And I think where people differ is
while most Iraqi Shias agree with that concern, they
differ slightly on what is the best way to deal with
it.
BLITZER: Michael Ware, how do you feel or how do you
know that Iran is playing a significant role in Iraq
right now? What tangible evidence is there that they
are so deeply involved?
WARE: Well, certainly, we have Iraqi Shia militias
who, in their quieter moments, will concede that,
yes, they do have certain alignments with Iran. And
then further, we have the evidence that U.S. military
intelligence has compiled.
Now, chief among this, apart from the tons of
ordinance that bears recent Iranian markings that is
being used here in Iraq -- and given the nature of
the state control of its munitions in Tehran we know
simply haven't popped up on the black market --
there's also particular key individuals in U.S.
custody who have confessed to very strong links to
elite elements of Iran's military apparatus. And,
indeed, they have a multitude of documents that tend
to corroborate this. I think on the body of evidence
that there is an extremely persuasive case to the
point where there is not a single U.S. official in
this country who shoulders any doubt that Iran is
playing an active military hand in this country.
BLITZER: We're going to pick that up with Michael
Gordon in just a moment. A lot more to discuss with
our panel: Laith Kubba, Michael Gordon, Michael Ware.
We'll take a quick break. "Late Edition" will
continue right after this.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
AYAD ALLAWI, FORMER PRIME MINISTER OF IRAQ: I don't
see that we are getting closer to reconciliation. I
don't see we are getting closer to getting rid of
militias. I'm not seeing that we are getting closer
to having assertive policies, foreign policies which
would not allow Iran to intervene in Iraqi affairs.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
BLITZER: Iraq's former interim prime minister, Ayad
Allawi, here on "Late Edition" last week with some
strong words. Welcome back. We're getting insight
into what's happening in Iraq right now, politically
as well as militarily, from Laith Kubba, Michael Ware
and Michael Gordon.
Michael Gordon, you have an important article in The
New York Times Sunday magazine today which goes into
great detail on this U.S. effort to work with Iraqi
Sunnis. Former insurgents, but it's causing a lot of
heartburn for the Iraqi Shiites.
GORDON: Right, Wolf. Well, there has been a change in
the situation in Iraq, at least in the military
domain. And it's partly a consequence of the surge.
And when the Americans sent additional forces to
Diyala north of Baghdad and south of Baghdad, what
happened is a lot of the local Sunnis there who were
basically turned against the Al Qaida of Iraq
militants saw this as an opportunity to strike a
marriage of convenience with the Americans. And as an
embedded correspondent I was with one of the units
that was carrying out raids with these insurgents.
BLITZER: But the Iraqi government doesn't like this,
especially giving arms to these Sunnis, because they
think it's simply going to enable them to kill
Shiites down the road.
GORDON: Well, the American military does not give
them arms. What it does is, it helps them get
organized, it vets them and it pays them for some of
their services. And they may take the money and buy
arms.
But it's a double-edged sword, as you point out. This
is a means to pacify and provide security for places
like Baquba or Arab Jabour, different locations in
Iraq. Not just Anbar. So, it's a very positive
development. The problem is getting the Iraqi
government, which is a Shiite-dominated government,
to accept them and institutionalize this arrangement.
BLITZER: And the other problem, Laith Kubba, is that
once the U.S. leaves those areas, whether the
al-Anbar Province or Diyala or anyplace else where
they've made some military inroads, the whole thing
could collapse very quickly.
KUBBA: I think the concern is real. There are
tactical benefits of creating or pushing a wedge
between the local insurgents and al Qaida. There is
tactical benefits in stopping them shooting at the
Americans, but I think this does not address the real
concern that basically the insurgency has a totally
different political view, that within the Shias,
there is heightened concerns.
And I do believe it is not the position of the U.S.
Army to micromanage Iraq local wars. I think there
ought to be a very clear strategy. One needs to stick
to it. I am concerned about these emerging pockets
that are reorganized that do not share the political
view on how Iraq should proceed.
BLITZER: Button this up for us, Michael Ware, because
you know this situation about as well as anyone.
We're all waiting for General Petraeus's report,
Ambassador Ryan Crocker's report. That's coming up in
the next few days.
But for all practical purposes, what do you see
happening on the ground in Iraq over the next six to
nine months, let's say?
WARE: Well, it depends on a whole host of things,
Wolf, as you can well imagine. I mean, in my opinion,
there's a very brief window right now for America to
finally act decisively. Where it's plodded and
fumbled, now is a moment for it to recapture the
momentum. It's whether they will take that
opportunity or not.
What we could see if we look to, say, Basra in the
south, for example, the key oil region, the
oil-producing region, is that this place could simply
disassemble into a region of militia blocs who will
all be at great rivalry and essentially warring
factions, as we saw in Lebanon in the '80s.
Clearly this is a concern that the Iraqi government
cites when it criticizes the American program of
backing these Sunni militias. Now, indeed, whilst
we've all done embeds with U.S. forces who are
working with the Sunni insurgents now, we've just
returned from al-Anbar Province ourself, where we
embedded, so to speak, with the insurgents.
We were the guests of the Islamic Army of Iraq, the
Brigades of the 1920 Revolution, former members of al
Qaida, and other groups of Baathists and Iraqi
nationalists. Now, they are essentially America's
insurance policy, an insurance policy to keep
America's Arab allies on-side with the developments
here and as a counterbalance to the Iranian-backed
Shia militias which simply dominate this government.
BLITZER: Michael Ware reporting for us from Baghdad.
Laith Kubba, thanks very much for joining us from
London. Michael Gordon of The New York Times here in
Washington.